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POINT I 
TRENTON TAYLOR'S COMPLETE FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO 
Et RECOLLECT HIS MEETING WITH POLICE AND PRIOR 
STATEMENT, MADE HIS TESTIMONY "UNAVAILABLE" FOR 
MEANINGFUL OR EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
ADMITTING HIS PRIOR STATEMENT THUS VIOLATED 
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND UTAH RULES 
€il OF EVIDENCE. 
The gravamen of Mr. Reyos' argument in Point I of his opening brief is that 
Trenton Taylor's testimony was "unavailable," within the meaning of both the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, specifically, Utah R. Evid. Rule 804(a): "(a) Criteria for 
being unavailable. -- A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the 
~ declarant: (3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter; ... " Taylor testified 
to remembering nothing. 
held: 
That is the problem. The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-
court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and 
subject to full and effective cross-examination. 
Cal. v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935 (1970), cited by the State. 
@ St. Br., p. 17-18. But Mr. Reyos did not have the opportunity for "full and 
effective cross-examination." Where a witness is unavailable, even "prior to trial 
or preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine." United States v Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 
1 
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57, 124 Sup. Ct. 1354,1367 (2004)(emphasis added) citing, inter alia, California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. at 165-168. Green is simply a case where the witness took the 
stand, and the prosecution introduced a prior inconsistent statement made at 
preliminary hearing under oath, although not subject to cross examination, as 
substantive evidence. Green, 399 U.S., at 152. "(W)e do not find the instant 
preliminary hearing significantly different from an actual trial to warrant 
distinguishing the two cases for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 149. 
That is consistent with Utah law, but it is not this case. The prior statement of 
Trenton Taylor was not inconsistent with his testimony of having no memory of it 
whatsoever. He was simply mentally and totally emotionally unavailable, had 
never been cross-examined and could not be cross-examined at trial. 
A major distinction between this case and Green, which the State has not 
addressed, is the fact that the witness in Green acknowledged making the prior 
statement: "the Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence the 
prior statements of a witness who concedes making the statements, and who may 
be asked to defend or otherwise explain the inconsistency between his prior and his 
present version of the events in question, thus opening himself to full cross-
examination at trial as to both stories. Cal. v. Green, 399 U.S. at 164. That is not 
the instant case. The Comt in Green simply ratified what is well understood, that 
a prior inconsistent statement may be introduced as substantive evidence. See 
2 
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2011 Advisory Committee Note to Utah R. Evid. Rule 801 with respect to 
4i) subsection ( d)( 1 ). The essential nub of the inquiry as highlighted by Green is 
whether the statement in the instant matter was inconsistent ( or consistent) with 
Taylor's testimony. In fact, it was neither. Consequently it was hearsay and 
should have been excluded for Mr. Reyos' inability to cross-examine. See State v. 
Barker, 797 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ["(R)ule 801(d)(l) applies only if the 
4i) declarant "is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." Cross-
examination in Barker was denied by the trial court. Thus, the declarant's out-of-
court, inconsistent statement was deemed hearsay and should not have been 
admitted. The party adversely affected by it has a right to examine the declarant 
concerning the statement.]. Id. at 455. 
The question turns on whether the witness testimony was available for cross-
examination. "Whether a witness is "unavailable," is controlled by Utah R. Evid. 
804( a)." State v. Barela, 799 P .2d 1140, 1143 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A witness is 
unavailable if he "testifies to not remembering the subject matter." Utah R. Evid. 
804(a)(3). This is consistent with federal authorities: 
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that a witness may be 
classified as "unavailable" for the purpose of the hearsay exception if 
he "testifies to a lack of memory" and his "claim of lack of memory" 
is not the result of any wrong-doing by the moving party. Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(a). See also J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence,§ 80l(d)(l)(A)[04], at 100 n.13 (1980); Saltzburg and 
Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 600, 613 (2d Ed. 1977). 
3 
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United States v. Hsu, 439 A.2d 469,471 (D.C. 1981). In other words, as in the 
instant case, the witness remembers nothing of "the subject matter." That is 
different from remembering the subject matter, but forgetting the substance, or 
details, which would be subject to cross-examination. "It makes no difference 
whether the witness becomes "unavailable" before or after she takes the witness 
stand." People v. Learn, 396 Ill. App. 3d 891, 898-99, 336 Ill. Dec. 117, 124, 919 
N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (2009) citing People v. Coleman, 205 Ill. App. 3d 567, 583, 
563 N.E.2d 1010, 150 Ill. Dec. 883 (1990)[" A similar conclusion as to when a 
child witness becomes "unavailable" has been reached by the Federal courts (see, 
e.g., Gregory v. North Carolina (4th Cir. 1990), 900 F.2d 705 (and cases cited 
therein)), and in the State courts (see, e.g., State v. Jones (1989), 112 Wash. 2d 
488, 772 P.2d 496; State v. Chandler (1989), 324 N.C. 172,376 S.E.2d 728; State 4D 
v. Drusch (1987), 139 Wis. 2d 312,407 N.W.2d 328).]. 
The State cites a post-Crawford case which does not speak to the specific 
issue in the instant case, but is illustrative of the problem. Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,311, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) citing Crawford, 
supra, at 541 U.S. 54, 124 S. Ct. at 1354. St. Br. p. 18. The Massachusetts trial 
court in Melendez-Diaz admitted into evidence affidavits reporting the results of 
forensic analysis showing that material seized by the police and connected to the 
defendant was cocaine. The issue was whether those affidavits were "testimonial," 
4 
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rendering the affiants "witnesses" subject to the defendant's right of confrontation 
e under the Sixth Amendment. Id., 557 U.S. at 307, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. The 
Melendez Court held that, 
the analysts' affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts 
e were "witnesses" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a 
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that 
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner 
was entitled to "'be confronted with"' the analysts at trial. 
~ Id., 557 U.S. at 311, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 54, 124 S. Ct. at 
1354. 
Suppose, arguendo, the forensic analysts in Melendez were called to the 
witness stand and testified to the effect that, yes the signature on the certificate 
looked like his but he had no recollection of either performing the analysis, 
• preparing the report, or rendering an opinion. In other words, the analyst's 
recollection was not in any way refreshed and he could not remember any aspect of 
the analysis or the report. In such a case, he would be "unavailable as a witness," 
having testified to not remembering the subject matter; ... " as enunciated in Utah 
R. Evid. 804. This is precisely the instant circumstance. The witness, Trenton 
41> Taylor, should have been declared unavailable under 804(a)(3). 
The State cites Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 
2531 ( 1980) essentially for the proposition that as long as there is a body in a chair 
capable of taking the oath, that satisfies all Confrontation Clause concerns. St. Br. 
5 
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at 18. Crawford rejected Roberts application of an evidentiary standard, i.e., 
allowing admission of an out-of-court statement of an unavailable witness, who 
testified at preliminary hearing but was not fully cross-examined, on the basis that 
the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability"' and fell either within a "firmly 
rooted hearsay exception" or bore ''particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. The Court in Crawford held: "Leaving the 
regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the 
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial 
practices." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. Crawford made clear in rejecting various 
evidentiary rules as a measure of reliability, as Roberts had done, that the 
Confrontation Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. Id. at 61. "It commands, not that di) 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by 
testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, 
not only about the desirability of reliable evidence ( a point on which there could be 
little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. Id. Crawford 
further noted that, "(i)n sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned 
with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law 
enforcement officers fall squarely within that class." Id. 541 U.S. at 53. 
6 
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The confrontation contemplated is "a personal examination and cross-
• examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling 
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and 
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
@}) 242-243 ( 1895). It cannot be called a face to face, eye to eye, confrontation when 
the witness sits in total amnesia of the subject matter. One of the concerns of the 
Crawford Court was allowing statements into evidence which may have satisfied 
the local, changeable rules of evidence. "The unpardonable vice of the Roberts 
test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit 
• core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to 
exclude." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 63. Trenton Taylor's statement 
might arguably be construed to satisfy Rule 801, but it cannot satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause, because his testimony was unavailable. 
Here, the trial court determined that, even though Taylor remembered 
• nothing of the prior interview or events surrounding it, he was "available" to testify 
and could be cross-examined under Rule 80 I ( d). R.1256-1260. This cannot be 
where a witness flatly remembers nothing whatsoever of the subject matter. That 
was exactly one of Crawford's "rules of evidence" concerns. The vagaries of Rule 
7 
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801 simply make the test "unpredictable" and allows admission of "core 
testimonial statements that the Gonfrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
The State further cites State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1989) 
for the proposition that if a witness is present, he cannot be unavailable regardless 
of whether he can be meaningfully or effectively cross-examined. Br. St. 18. But 
Eldredge's holding is mainly non-binding dicta, that "the admission of such 
hearsay does not abridge a defendant's right to confrontation if the child victim is 
present and available to testify and be cross-examined." Ibid at 33. That is 
because the Court in Eldredge further elaborated, "here the child actually testified 
and was cross-examined quite effectively." Id. ( emphasis added). Eldridge is thus 
thoroughly distinguishable. 
As previously pointed out, "'In determining unavailability, the focus is not 
on the unavailability of the witness per se but on the unavailablity of his or her 
testimony. '" Mr. Reyos' Opening Brief ("OB"), at 32, citing Mangrum and Benson 
on Utah Evidence, 2015 - 2016 Ed., page 866 ( emphasis added) and numerous 
authorities. "A witness should be found unavailable under Rule 804(a)(3) only if 
he insists he has no recollection of the alleged crime." State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 
599, 603 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1988) citing United States v. Hsu, 439 A.2d 469 (D.C. 
1981 ), cited supra; People v. Liddicoat, 120 Cal. App. 3d 512, 17 4 Cal. Rptr. 649 
8 
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(198l)(witness present but deemed not competent to testify at trial, was therefore 
(i) unavailable, allowing admission of her preliminary hearing testimony); David v. 
State, 269 Ark. 498, 601 S.W.2d 864 (1980)(a witness is unavailable under 
evidence Rule 804(a) ifhe testifies to a lack of memory on the subject). 
The State asserts that the pre-Crawford case, United States v. Owens, 484 
U.S. 554, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988), vindicates its position. Br.St. 19. Owens allowed 
ii> "an identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss, 
to testify concerning the basis for the identification," on the basis that it was 
admissible under evidence Rule 801 as opposed to 804. Owens, 484 U.S. at 564, 
108 S. Ct. at 845. Rule 801 specifically defines as "not hearsay," a statement 
which "identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier." See Ut. 
i) Rules. Evid. Rule 801 ( d)(l )( c ). Whether Crawford, given its rejection of the 
Roberts' reliance on traditional rules of evidence, would approve of this clearly 
testimonial statement of a police officer, is unknown. In any event, United States 
v. Owens does not address the instant circumstances. 
Nor is the even earlier case, Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct. 
qj 292 (1985), cited by the State helpful. Br. St. p. 19-20. In Fensterer the question 
was whether the admission of the opinion testimony of the prosecution's expert 
witness, who was unable to recall the basis for his opinion, denied Fensterer his 
9 
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Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Id., 474 U.S. 16, 
106 S. Ct. 292-93 (1985). The Supreme Court held that, 
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness 
called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is 
marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the 
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given 
a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities 
through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the 
factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' 
testimony. 
Id., 474 U.S. at 21-22, 106 S. Ct. at 295. The language of Fensterer highlights the 
problem in this case, which is not that his testimony was "marred by 
forgetfulness," but that he essentially did not testify, remembered nothing, in 
absolute terms, and the defense was not afforded "a full and fair opportunity to 
probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to 
the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' 
testimony." Id. 
It is difficult to understand the State's conclusion that Mr. Reyos may have 
somehow abandoned the hearsay argument. Br.St. p. 21. Non-availability was 
clearly the basis of Mr. Reyos' argument. Ut. Rule of Evidence 804 as a basis for 
finding "unavailability" was referenced throughout Point I. See OB, pps. 28, 31, 
32. These references are well subsequent to the reference to Crawford and the 
Confrontation Clause on page 25 of the Opening Brief, and Mr. Reyos' isolated 
statements are taken out of context. True, Point I is phrased in tenns of 
10 
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• 
confrontation. But that is merely a heading. The heading of a Point does not 
• foreclose argument of other matters not included therein. The determination of 
"unavailability" is necessarily a determination which must be made by reference to 
the rules of evidence. See OB p. 32, discussing the fact that it is not the witness' 
unavailability but the unavailability of the testimony in relation, inter alia, to Rule 
804 and the scholarly works cited which discuss the subject. Further, the State 
• truncated the statement made on page 31 of the opening brief, which was a 
reference to a specific case, United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 
2005), citing Crawford 541 U.S. at 52, 59, about which it was stated, "Since the 
argument regarding the rules of evidence is rendered academic by Crawford, '"(I)f 
hearsay is "testimonial," ... the Confrontation Clause prohibits its admission at 
<i> trial unless ( 1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant."' OB p. 31. The reference was clearly 
to the "testimonial" nature of prior statements, and read in context with the 
remainder of Point I, was obviously not intended as a complete abnegation of the 
hearsay rule. Otherwise, the numerous references to Ut. Rule Evid. 804 as well as 
• 801 would have been immaterial and unnecessary. As Mr. Reyos put it, 
subsequent to the quoted statement, "The rules of evidence are of course relevant 
to the issue of availability." OB p. 31. 
11 
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Mr. Reyos' statement that the error was structural is also challenged by the 
State, Br. St. p. 22, as having been rejected by Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986) in its discussion of the case cited by Mr. Reyos, 
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1246 (1966). OB p. 35. What 
the Supreme Court in Van Arsdall stated about Brookhart is highly relevant and 
illuminating in the instant matter. It said, quoting Brookhart, as follows: 
(Davis) [Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308(1974)] was thus denied the 
right of effective cross-examination which "would be constitutional 
error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of 
prejudice would cure it." Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3."' 415 U.S., 
at 318 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968)). 
Read properly, however, Davis does not support an automatic reversal 
rule, and the above-quoted language merely reflects the view that on 
the facts of that case the trial court's error had done "serious 
damage" to the petitioner's defense. 
Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682-83, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (1986)(emphasis 
added). The emphasized language underscores the focus of Mr. Reyos' Point I. 
• 
The inability to effectively cross-examine Trenton Taylor, a virtual inability to (i) 
engage in the time honored face to face confrontation in spite of his physical 
presence, rendered his testimony "unavailable," and the introduction of his ex parte 
police interrogation was a "constitutional error of the first magnitude and no 
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 3. 
There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Mr. Reyos had 
Taylor's statement been kept out of evidence. State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
79, ~ 18, 34 P.3d 187. In any event it was an error of sufficient consequence that 
this Court's confidence in the verdict must necessarily be undermined. Id. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
€IJ MR. REYOS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON THE 
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE 
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF NATASHA ALVORADO. 
The State acknowledges that "Reyos moved for a directed verdict, he said 
only that "the State has not proven the elements beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that no jury could find that." Rl509. Given the testimony (or lack thereof) at trial, 
€i> this motion could not relate to anything other than the upside down testimony of 
Natasha Alvarado. Take out the prior statement of Trenton Taylor as discussed in 
Point I, supra, and what one must rely upon is the testimony of Alvarado. She was 
the only purported percipient witness. Thus, the motion for a directed verdict 
could only have gone to the validity of the testimony of Alvarado. 
• 
Even under the plain error standard, it should have been clear to the trial 
court that "(i) [a]n error exists in the ramshackle nature of Alvarado's testimony; 
(ii) the error in basing a verdict on such dubious testimony was obvious; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the appellant, or confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
State v. Christensen, 2014 UT App 166, ~ 11, 331 P.3d 1128, 1132 citing State v. 
Dunn, 850 P .2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993 ). The evidence supporting the 
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conviction of the crime charged was insufficient and the insufficiency was so 
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the 
jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Il 7. 
In order to establish that Alvorado' s testimony was anything but "inherently 
improbable," the State relies upon the ex parte statement of Trenton Taylor, which, 
as argued in Point I, supra, should never have been admitted. St. Br. 25-26. The 
error regarding Taylor's testimony only compounds the problem of Alvorado' s <Ii 
testimony. It should have been obvious to the trial court that Alvarado's testimony 
could not, alone, withstand scrutiny. 
The State further argues that the surveillance video evidence supports 
Alvarado's testimony. Br. St. p. 26. But Detective Hudson's testimony regarding 
what he observed on the video is very confusing, occasionally vague, and difficult 
to understand in general. R. l 024-1071. In fact, based upon the video, the police 
believed that a body was being carried out of the motel, that the case involved a 
body dump. R.1496-7; R.1524; R.1521. All the record establishes about the case 
is that it could as easily been a murder by Natasha or any combination of her 
and/or one of the other miscreants who were habituees of room 110 at Zion's 
Motel, and a body dump, as testified by Shelby Reed and further testified and 
sworn to by Detective Lougy. R.1522-24. 
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The evidence was so inconsistent and inconclusive that the trial court should 
• well have realized it would not pass muster and that no reasonable jury should 
have been allowed to speculate on the guilt of Mr. Reyos. The State is correct that 
where the prosecution possesses evidence conducive to the end of establishing 
guilt, that it be given due opportunity to do so. Br. St. p. 27 citing State v. 
Lamorte, 610 P .2d 342, 345-34 7 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1980). Mr. Reyos agrees with the 
State that, "Because trial error is essentially a failure of process, the remedy is 
further process ... " Br. St. p. 28. That is what brings the case to this Court - for a 
determination that the trial court erred. 
But this Court, in reviewing the matter as a whole, must recognize the 
invalidity of basing corroboration upon the ex parte statement of Trenton Taylor. 
e> This is contrary to the view of the State that, 
In other words, even if this Court were free to discount Alvarado's 
testimony as incredible, it is not free to discount Taylor's prior 
statements in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. And because 
Taylor's prior statements provide sufficient evidence to convict Reyos 
of aggravated murder, Reyos' Robbins claim fails. 
Br. St. p. 28. But this Court should take into consideration the inadmissibility of 
e Trenton Taylor's testimony in evaluating the verity and trustworthiness of 
Alvorado's testimony via State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288. The State 
relies on Alvarado's own self-serving statement that her "drug use may have 
affected her memory of when things happened, but not her memory of what Reyos 
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did and why." Br. St. p. 31. But that hardly rehabilitates the numerous versions of 
what may have happened which she gave to the police and others as set forth in 
considerable detail in Mr. Reyos' Opening Brief, Point II. The question remains -
which version? 
On this record, even if reviewed for plain error, which Mr. Reyos does not 
concede is required, there was an insufficiency of the evidence that was "so 
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the Cl 
jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I 17, 10 P.3d 346. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE SENTENCING SCHEME PRESENTED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 76- 3 - 207.7 AND 76-5-202 AS WELL AS WHETHER A JURY 
SHOULD HA VE SENTENCED MR. REYOS, OR WHETHER, AT A 
MINIMUM, THE JURY SHOULD HA VE MADE THE FINDINGS <if 
UNDERLYING HIS SENTENCE. 
A. AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE MAY BE CORRECTED AT ANY 
TIME. 
This unpreserved issue is entirely a legal one, for which this Court would 
give deference to a trial court's ruling. For the reasons stated in Point III of Mr. 
Reyos' Opening Brief, which will not be reiterated, it is a rare procedural anomaly. @ 
In brief, it is a rare occurrence, and highly anomalous, where two statutes address 
sentencing of individuals convicted of the same offense, i.e., aggravated murder. 
One provides for sentencing by a jury, the other for sentencing to occur by the trial 
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• 
judge, yet both are convicted of the same offense, aggravated murder. What is 
anomalous is that both are, at the time of sentencing, similarly situated. Yet one is 
sentenced by the court, the other by a jury. The circumstances are no less 
exceptional than those set forth in the cases cited by the State. Br. St. 34. 
In any event, it is well recognized that, an illegal sentence may be corrected 
at any time. Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 22(e); State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, , 16, 
I) _P3d_, (2016). So regardless of whether the argument was made or 
preserved, whether it is in fact a "rare procedural anomaly," or whether it should 
be reviewed for "manifest prejudice," this Court can address the question of the 
constitutionality of the questions which are thoroughly briefed by both Mr. Reyos 
and the State. The Supreme Court in Houston stated: 
As we describe in greater detail below, we hold that each of Mr. 
Houston's constitutional challenges falls within the narrow scope of 
rule 22(e)'s exception to the preservation of claims. We therefore 
decline the State's request to overrule our precedent in State v. 
Candedo. Under rule 22( e ), we treat Mr. Houston's claims as if they 
GI> had been preserved, reviewing conclusions of law for correctness and 
granting no deference to the district court. Because rule 22( e) provides 
a higher standard than "manifest prejudice" review, we decline to 
address Mr. Houston's alternative argument. 
• State v. Houston, 2015 UT at ,I 16. 
• 
B. THE STATUTORY SCHEME SUBJECTS MR. REYOS TO A 
DISPARATE SENTENCING STATUTE FROM OTHERS 
SIMILARLY SITUATED . 
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The State argues that the constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme 
raised in Point III of Mr. Reyos' Opening Brief is foreclosed by controlling 
precedent. Br. St. p. 31. It correctly identifies the two sentencing statutes in 
question: Utah Code Ann. 76- 3 - 207 and 76 - 3 -207.7. Br. St. p. 31-32. 
Although the State speaks in terms of a subsequent more lenient sentence, to 
which one convicted of a crime would be entitled under the rule of lenity, it seems 
to recognize that if there are two, side-by-side, statutes which punish the same 
crime, a person convicted would be entitled to the more lenient one. Br. St. p. 39. 
The point is not necessarily that one sentenced under one statute would necessarily 
be advantaged by not being sentenced under the other. The point is that one 
statute, under the circumstances of the individual case, may lend itself to 
sentencing by a jury, where in another case, sentencing before the court might be 
advantageous. One may be more lenient than the other, depending on the 
circumstances. This begs the question of why there are two separate statutes which 
provide for sentencing for the same identical offense. This is why the sentencing 
scheme is arbitrary and capricious. 
There is no question that State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 322 P.3d 624 
addressed the constitutionality of 76-3-207.7 and ruled that in the context of Utah's 
entire sentencing scheme, sufficient guidance was provided under the totality of 
circumstances. Perea at~ 110. The Court in Perea declined to visit Perea's due 
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process claim, as inadequately briefed. Id. ,I122. The State seems to believe that 
• Reyos is challenging the holding of Perea. Addressing as it does only §76-3-
207. 7, Mr. Reyos is not attempting to persuade this Court to depart from the 
holding of Perea. Nor, except as discussed infra, does Reyos have any reason to 
challenge the holding of State v. Houston, supra, as it addresses sentencing 
provided by§ 76-3-207, as it is taken in isolation. 
C. THE STATUTORY SCHEME FOR SENTENCING 
AGGRAVATED MURDER VIOLATES THE UNIFORM 
OPERATION OF LAWS CLAUSE BECAUSE NOT ALL PEOPLE 
CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED MURDER ARE SIMILARLY 
SITUATED. 
In discussing the claims made by Mr. Reyos, the State consistently responds 
to the arguments made in the Opening Brief Point III, by taking one statute or the 
other, primarily §76-3-207.7, as though the claim were against that statute alone. 
Br. St. pps. 41-44. That misses the point entirely. The problem is not that one or 
the other statute is deficient. The problem is precisely that there are two statutes 
which address exactly the same offense for sentencing purposes. Any distinction is 
mere semantics. Mr. Reyos does not gainsay that each of the statutes, as 
construed, is underlain with standards which guide the sentencer's hand. That is 
not the issue. 
The State argues that the "noncapital sentencing statute does not violate the 
uniform operation of laws clause because not all people convicted of aggravated 
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murder are similarly situated." Br. St. p.41. That is not the point. The fact of the 
matter is, not all people convicted of any crime are similarly situated. The 
similarity lies in the fact that, everyone convicted of a burglary will be sentenced 
under the statute addressing burglaries, everyone convicted of rape will be 
sentenced under the penalty statute addressing rape, et cetera. It is axiomatic that 
no two burglaries are alike, no two rapists are alike, no two offenders of any 
particular crime are alike, i.e., their backgrounds and the circumstances of each 
crime will be such that no two individuals will be truly "similarly situated." That 
is the same with those convicted of aggravated murder, whether the case begins 
with the prosecutor giving notice of intent to seek the death penalty, or not. If in 
the end, each being convicted of aggravated murder ( or "non-capital" murder or 
• 
• 
"capital murder" sans the death penalty), neither will be subjected to the death ce 
penalty. There simply is no rational basis for one to be sentenced by the court and 
the other to be sentenced by a jury. That is the sum and substance of Mr. Reyos' 
argument: that the sentencing scheme for aggravated murder ( call it capital or 
noncapital), where the death penalty is off the table, violates the uniform operation 
of laws clause under the Utah State Constitution and equal protection of the laws • 
under the United States Constitution because it divides similarly situated persons 
into two subclasses for sentencing purposes with no rational basis. The statutory 
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dichotomy is arbitrary and capricious, violates due process, equal protection, and 
i> the uniform application of the law. 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all citizens equal protection of the 
law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
requires "that the operation of the law be uniform." The Utah Constitution 
provides that, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah 
ce Const. Art. 1, Sec. 24. As laid out in the State's brief, there are three questions 
which must be answered in order to determine a violation of the uniform operation 
clause: 1. What, if any, classification is created under the statutory scheme; 2. 
Whether the classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate 
treatment; and 3. Whether the Legislature had any reasonable objective that 
e warrants the disparity. Br. St. p. 42, quoting Houston at, 43. The State maintains 
that Reyos fails the second step of the analysis. Br. St. p. 42. That would be true if 
only one statute were involved. But there are two statutes, one sentencing for 
aggravated murder if the jury has found that the death penalty should not apply, the 
other sentencing for aggravated murder if the prosecutor decides that the death 
penalty should not apply. There is no rational basis for the distinction and the 
disparate treatment, taking 207 and 207. 7 together, cannot be justified on the basis 
of anything but semantics. "If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been 
filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(3)(a). Calling one convicted by a jury, but the jury 
having found against the death penalty, a capital murder, and the other, the 
prosecutor having removed the death penalty from the equation, and aggravated 
murder or noncapital murder, is simply sophistry. 
Because the arguments made by the State do not address this issue, but 
undertake a response to arguments not made by Mr. Reyos, no further response to 
• 
those arguments will be put forth. i> 
D. ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES ENTITLES MR. REYOS TO 
JURY SENTENCING BECAUSE ANY FACT THAT INCREASES 
THE MANDATORY MINIMUM, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, IS AN 
"ELEMENT" THAT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. <il 
The last point made by the State is that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000) does not require a jury to make findings when increasing a minimum 
penalty. Br. St. p. 44. This may be true, arguendo, when a defendant pleads 
guilty, "because (when) Houston pled guilty, he 'admitted all the facts relevant' to 
make him subject to a potential life-without-parole sentence. Id. 'There were no Ci 
factual findings to be made by a jury, only a determination that [life without 
parole] would or would not be appropriate."' Br. St. p. 45 quoting Houston, ,r 32. 
It is certainly not true in a circumstance where there has been a trial by jury and no 
specific findings have been made by the jury to provide the judge a basis to 
sentence beyond the minimum mandatory of 25 years, as provided for aggravated 
murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 provides for two choices, life in prison 
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without parole, or 25 years to life. Under section 76-3-207.7, 25 years to life is the 
i> presumptive default sentence, not Life Without Parole. State v. Reece, 2015 UT 
45, 11 81- 83 n.149, 349 P.3d 712. Thus, a jury finding which increases the 
minimum mandatory sentence of 25 years to life is required. Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) states that Apprendi applies to minimum mandatory 
sentences as well: 
... any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" 
that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406)(2002)] is overruled. 
Alleyne at 2155 (2013). It cannot be made much more clear than that. 
Thus, 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutional under the Apprendi/Alleyne standard 
because it fails the requirement that "( f)acts that increase the mandatory minimum 
sentence are ... elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt," Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2158 (2013). An increase from 25 to life 
to LWOP must be based upon a jury's determination of the facts supporting the 
increase. The State counters that "Alleyne itself explains that so long as a jury 
finds all the facts necessary to expose a defendant to a given range of punishments, 
G'i the judge has "broad discretion ... to select a sentence within the range authorized 
by law." Br. St. p. 46, quoting Alleyne, 133 s.:Ct. at 2163; accord Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 481. But in this case, there is no "range" "within" 76-3-207.7. Judges have 
no discretion to increase the floor, a mandatory minimum, of 25 years ( or 26 in this 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case, based upon a jury finding) to, say, thirty-five or forty years. There are only 
two options: 25 to life or life without parole. Alleyne stands for the proposition 
that any fact which supports the increase from the mandatory minimum of 25 years 
to a mandatory life sentence is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury. 
CONLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Reyos requests this Court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ')-1 day of August, 2016. 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF RULE 24 COMPLIANCE 
Appellant certifies pursuant to Rule 24(f)(l)(C) Utah R. App. P. that the 
torney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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• 
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original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals and a searchable 
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WILLIAM M. HAINS, Esq., Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 
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2016 . 
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